2011年7月28日 星期四

產品生命週期表與創新雷達


The Enterprise Open Innovation Strategy by Web 2.0
廖肇弘 2007.3.19


一、前言 :
從彼得‧杜拉克的「創新與創業家精神」到克里斯汀生的「創新者的兩難」,「創新」(innovation)已成為當今全球企管界的顯學,因為惟有創新才能讓小企業有機會以小博大,才能讓老企業得以浴火重生。
創新不是只發生在新技術的研發,包含流程、組織、品牌、通路,都有可能因創新而使一家新公司迅速撼動在位者的領導地位或一夕間瓦解其競爭優勢。
創新人人會談,但問題是怎麼做?
APPLE  iPod 取代 Sony  Walkman、任天堂的 Wii開創遊戲機的藍海策略、Skype網路電話顛覆傳統電信業的營運架構、鳳凰城網路大學以 eLearning衝擊全球教育產業、ZARA以快速時尚(Fast Fashion)的概念成為全球服裝業霸主等,許許多多的經典案例讓企業經理人們體認到了創新的威力,也了解到創新是無所不在的。
或許我們可以從報章雜誌中閱讀到許多有關創新的案例,但對於每天都需要輔導企業進行「創新」的實務工作的我來說,「創新」可不是名詞,更不是形容詞,而是動詞,而且是現在進行式!創新代表的是企業經理人如何勝過對手、贏得市場、攸關企業優勝劣敗乃至存亡的一連串正確決策與行動。
二、產品生命週期的創新策略 (Innovation on Product Life Cycle)
創新人人想做,但成功者幾何?
在進行創新之前,企業經理人第一個要面臨到的問題便是 : 應該如何選擇適當的創新切入點?如何配置組織和資源?如何激發創新的產生?還有最重要的,如何在最短的時間內以最有效的策略,贏過競爭對手或超越自己?
彼得‧度拉克早在其「創新與創業精神」一書中就提出了創新的七項可能來源,包括 : 意料之外的事件、不一致的現象、程序需要、產業與市場結構、人口統計資料的變遷、認知的改變、新知識。企業經理人或許可以從上述七種來源檢視創新可能發生的跡象,但要形成主動性的創新策略,勢必需要採取更積極的作為,透過組織整體的運作及團隊的力量來促進創新的產生。
就我個人觀察,組織規模和創新的產生與否並沒有太直接的關係,大企業和小企業都有機會藉由不同的創新而產生不同程度競爭優勢。不過如果從產品生命週期(PLCProduct Life Cycle)的概念來看,當企業的產品或服務處在不同階段時,當然要採取的創新策略也將會有所不同。
從產品生命週期各階段來看,導入期最常見到的便屬技術創新 (Technological Innovation);在成長期,因為市場快速成長,應以建立品牌以及提升客戶忠誠度為主要的競爭策略;在成熟期的初期,如何透過標準化擴大產能及市場影響力,以擴大市場佔有率為主要的目標;到了成熟期的中後期,組織內部將面臨到組織再生工程 (Re-engineering)以及組織創新 (Organizational Innovation)的壓力,組織外部則將面臨到競爭者的強力挑戰,而必須提出更強勢的產品/服務創新 (Product/Service Innovation) 策略。成熟期也是重要的策略轉折點,如果能夠順利轉型,則企業將開創下一階段成長的動能;若無法跨越鴻溝,則將進入衰退期,企業仍可在此階段思考以流程創新 (Process Innovation)來減緩衰退期的傷害或是以降低成本的手段作為主要的競爭優勢。




產品生命週期各階段的創新策略圖
(2007, 廖肇弘)
三、創新雷達 (Innovation Radar)
每家企業的內外部環境有所不同,不見得都適用於以產品生命週期的概念來擬定同樣的競爭策略。或許近來所提出的「創新雷達」 (Innovation Radar) 可以讓企業經理人更全面、更仔細地檢視組織內外不同的創新來源。
創新雷達是美國西北大學 Kellogg 商學院教授及技術與創新研究中心主任默漢伯‧蕭尼(Mohanbir Sawhney) 訪談包括Microsoft, eBay, DuPont, Motorola, Sony… Fortune 500大企業的經理人所得出的研究成果。創新雷達歸納了WHATWHOHOWWHERE 四個面向,企業經理人可以透過「人物流通」四個維度,包括 : (Customer, 顧客)、物(Offering, 產品/服務)、流(Process, 流程)、通(通路,Presence),總計有12項指標來檢視並比較與競爭者之間的創新優勢強弱,讓企業全面檢測組織內外可能發生創新的蹤跡。

在創新雷達上畫上刻度,在不同的指標上標示出自己與競爭者比較的程度,可以讓企業經理人輕易地繪製一份創新競爭優勢比較圖,經理人也可以因此而更容易地擬定企業創新策略。
維度
指標
定義
案例
WHAT
Offering 產品/服務
企業針對產品或服務的創新。最常見的就是投入新產品或新服務研發及技術上所產生的創新。
MicrosoftWindows改良自APPLE 的麥金塔、3M  Post-it便利貼、APPLE  iPod + iTunes 開創了數位音樂新局等
Platform
平台
企業運用共通平台的概念,加上以標準化及模組化為基礎,擴大產品的生產產能或延伸服務的範圍。
迪士尼運用卡通平台製作了多部膾炙人口的動畫電影、MicrosoftOracle運用同樣的軟體平台開發出了暢銷的商用套裝軟體等皆屬之。
Solutions
解決方案
為了解決某一產業或特定顧客的問題,而提供完整的或量身訂製的產品/服務組合。
IBM 為企業客戶提出了 E-Buiness 的完整解決方案,為IBM成功轉型的關鍵。
WHO
Customers
顧客
顧客指得是購買公司的產品或服務以滿足需求的個人或組織。如何發掘未被滿足的顧客需求是企業擬定創新策略的重要思考方向。
王品台塑牛排重視顧客回饋以改善口味及提升服務品質、
Customer Experience 顧客體驗
顧客接觸或取得企業提供的產品或服務時的內在心理感受。如何運用體驗行銷(experience marketing)的讓顧客感受到產品或服務的價值也是創新的來源。
迪士尼樂園塑造的全家親子歡樂形象、文化大學推廣部的五星級e化環境使其成為全台灣規模最大且獲利最高的終身學習機構
Value Capture 價值獲取
簡單的說,就是新的Business Model。指得是企業以不同的形式產生不同獲利來源的創新手法。
Google的網路廣告獲利模式使其成為全球獲利最高的企業之一、FocusMedia以銷售全球網路電話的點數以及硬體認證來獲利。
HOW
Process 流程
重新定義企業運行的核心流程以提升效率及效果的創新。
Toyota 汽車的 Just-In-Time和看板系統等概念,使其成為全球汽車業領導者
Organization組織
組織的創新通常牽涉到組織架構、工作執掌的權責的變動、以及不同部門交互介面的重新定義。
DELLHPCiscoIT大廠面臨強大競爭時,皆將其部門重整為以顧客為導向的組織與分工。
Supply Chain 供應鏈
供應鏈創新指的是重新定義產品或服務和自製或外包關係。
NokiaSwatchZARA不全然為了降低成本而外包,但卻因定義供應鏈上的必要合作夥伴而產生創新综效。
WHERE
Presence 呈現
此即行銷4P常指的通路,更廣義的來說,Presence包含了產品和服務完整呈現給消費者接觸並購買的各種形式。
Starbuck在咖啡店中銷售情境音樂CD7-11在店面中使用Kiosk以及開始e化沖洗相片並到店取貨的服務
Networking 網路
包含了讓產品/服務與消費者接觸的有形網路以及網路,當然重點是運用網際網路產生的競爭優勢。
Amazon.com的網路書店傳奇,此外包括Webs-TV以及Netflex的網路電視/電影、網路銀行、網路證券等皆屬之。
Brand 品牌
品牌是企業向顧客傳遞產品品質與價值的承諾識別符號。品牌創新代表企業在產品或服務市場定位價值的全新詮釋。
ZARA以快速時尚、平價奢華成為全球知名服裝品牌、Toyota為了接入高級車市場創設了 Lexus 系列

四、Web 2.0 的新衝擊
其實,藉由跨領域的觀察與學習,也是企業經理人孕育創新思維的好來源。目前在網路業的最新話題,大概就屬 Web 2.0所造成的風潮了。從YouTubeGoogle16.5億美元收購、無名小站被Yahoo以新台幣七億元購併等等,網路業呈現從2000年以來難得的榮景。而 Web 2.0 的概念,事實上可以提供給許多產業的經理人對於企業創新有一番全新的視野。
BlogWikiSNS…等,屬於 Web 2.0 的應用越來越多,但其實所謂的Web2.0並沒有準確的定義,亦非革命性的改變,而是網路應用層面的轉型,強調的是用戶自己主導資訊的生產和傳播,打破了原來網站所慣用的單向傳輸模式。
Web 2.0名詞源自全球最大的電腦出版商歐萊禮公司(O'Reilly Media20034月在舊金山總部召開一場腦力激盪會議,歐萊禮公司的副總裁Dale Dougherty針對網際網路的未來發展趨勢,提出了一個新的 Web 2.0 的概念,此後各式各樣的 Web 2.0 創新應用便紛紛在網路上出爐,開始席捲全世界。
所謂的Web 2.0 並不是技術上的創新,但其強調的開放性以及使用者參與的概念,大大顛覆了傳統以往從供給到需求的的網路產業,其運作模式有別於Web1.0(傳統的入口網站為代表)強調對於使用者提供更好的互動性和黏著性。歸納起來,Web 2.0 的重要精神包括 : 使用者原生內容 UGC (User-Generated-Content)、開放式參與、即時互動、可交互引用..等。網路業炒得沸沸騰騰,但對其他產業的經理人來說,Web 2.0 在創新或企業經營管理上到底有什麼重要的意義?
事實上,大部分的企業都將創新策略視為競爭優勢的重要來源,所有創新策略的擬定都屬於機密,決策流程大都是從上而下,絕少企業願意在創新策略的擬定過程中和外人分享,更遑論是與顧客討論。然而Web 2.0 對於企業經理人的啟示是,使用者的參與能夠提昇企業的價值。使用者產生的內容本身其實就有其價值,而使用者與企業互動的過程中,提升對於企業所提供產品或服務的參與感,以及所立即得到的回應與認同感,更是擁有極高的價值。
因此,如何學習 Web 2.0 的精神,打開企業創新的大門,以開放的架構迎接創新的到來,以使用者需求為導向,讓顧客參與融入企業創新的核心流程,進而鎖定創新雷達上的關鍵指標,透過持續不斷改善的經營管理活動,或許就能以創新的概念,有效的建立企業的競爭優勢。
五、結 語
創新的發生或許有可能來自於偶然,也有人說企業創新最難的就是換掉主管的腦袋。但在我輔導的案例中,幾乎沒有因為一時興起或驚鴻一瞥而創新成功的案例。創新的成功與否其實和公司的規模並沒有太大的關係,而是存乎於企業領導人的一心而已。
在我看過的所謂成功的企業創新案例中,絕大多數的企業領導人內心,都擁有強烈的求勝企圖心,心中有一股必然要成功的堅定信念,而且都擁有一個紮實且執行力十足的經營團隊。或許我們可以這麼說,Web 2.0 的精神讓企業領導人打開創新的大門,加上一顆堅定求勝求好的決心,搭配擁有高度執行力手腳,那麼未來將沒有所謂的夕陽產業或夕陽公司,只有創新的公司或因不創新而滅忙的公司而已。

作者簡介 :
現任 : 中國文化大學創新育成中心執行長及亞洲管理經典研究中心主任。
http://incubator.sce.pccu.edu.tw

2011年7月25日 星期一

台灣文創產值約GDP4%

Brain.com 2011-07-15)你知道每天在電視上看到的動漫是日本第二大的重點產業嗎?此外,根據美國富比士雜誌(Forbes)統計,2003年上映的電影「海底總動員」,全球票房加上DVD等週邊商品,在不到一年的時間就創造了超過20億美元的產值,效益十分驚人。近幾年由於文創產業的快速成長,吸引全世界廣泛的關注,包括大家耳熟能詳的好萊塢電影、日本動漫、電玩等都屬於文創的範疇,而近年來刮起一陣韓流旋風的韓國,根據韓國KBS WORLD的報導,2010年文創產值高達72兆韓元(約台幣1.95兆),反觀台灣,根據文建會文創產業發展年報的統計,年產值約6000多億,只占了全國GDP的4%上下,對照日本的10%以上,韓國的6.3%,顯然還有很長的一段路要走。因此,台灣政府仿效韓國以政府與民間共同投資的方式,投入100億元辦理「加強投資文化創意產業實施方案」,除了降低業者風險提高投資意願,

2011年7月24日 星期日

先進文明的崩盤(google 書籍)


先進文明的崩盤

以下摘自Mr.Jamies
1988 年,約瑟夫‧恬特 (Joseph Tainter) 寫了“複雜社會的崩解 (The Collapse of Complex Societies)”一書,裡面研究了歷史上多個先進文明,包括羅馬帝國、馬雅人等等,分析為何他們在達到了非常細膩且複雜的社會組織、文化傳統、和先進技術後,都在很短的時間內便分崩離析。
在種種研究之後,恬特驚人的結論是,複雜的社會結構,正是他們滅亡的最重要原因。原來,一開始,增加組織的複雜度可以提升生產力,讓他們更有效的利用周邊豐富的天然資源。然而,隨著邊際效應遞減,一定的程度之後,任何新增的結構只會徒增組織的負擔。
於是,當有一天天災人禍來臨,資源不再豐富時,這些極端複雜的組織無法反應,最後因此走向崩解。
你一定要問,為什麼這些組織在發現資源不再豐盛時,不能即時縮編,來因應變化呢?因為他們沒辦法。長期下來的複雜統制結構,會形成一個互相鎖死的權力系統,使得沒有人有辦法主導變化的發生。況且任何的簡化過程,都會讓統治階層的權威受到挑戰,而遭受到他們的阻撓。


The Collapse of Complex Business Models


from clay shirky :http://www.shirky.com/weblog/2010/04/the-collapse-of-complex-business-models/ 
I gave a talk last year to a group of TV executives gathered for an annual conference. From the Q&A after, it was clear that for them, the question wasn’t whether the internet was going to alter their business, but about the mode and tempo of that alteration. Against that background, though, they were worried about a much more practical matter: When, they asked, would online video generate enough money to cover their current costs?
That kind of question comes up a lot. It’s a tough one to answer, not just because the answer is unlikely to make anybody happy, but because the premise is more important than the question itself.
There are two essential bits of background here. The first is that most TV is made by for-profit companies, and there are two ways to generate a profit: raise revenues above expenses, or cut expenses below revenues. The other is that, for many media business, that second option is unreachable.
Here’s why.


* * *

In 1988, Joseph Tainter wrote a chilling book called The Collapse of Complex Societies. Tainter looked at several societies that gradually arrived at a level of remarkable sophistication then suddenly collapsed: the Romans, the Lowlands Maya, the inhabitants of Chaco canyon. Every one of those groups had rich traditions, complex social structures, advanced technology, but despite their sophistication, they collapsed, impoverishing and scattering their citizens and leaving little but future archeological sites as evidence of previous greatness. Tainter asked himself whether there was some explanation common to these sudden dissolutions.
The answer he arrived at was that they hadn’t collapsed despite their cultural sophistication, they’d collapsed because of it. Subject to violent compression, Tainter’s story goes like this: a group of people, through a combination of social organization and environmental luck, finds itself with a surplus of resources. Managing this surplus makes society more complex—agriculture rewards mathematical skill, granaries require new forms of construction, and so on.
Early on, the marginal value of this complexity is positive—each additional bit of complexity more than pays for itself in improved output—but over time, the law of diminishing returns reduces the marginal value, until it disappears completely. At this point, any additional complexity is pure cost.
Tainter’s thesis is that when society’s elite members add one layer of bureaucracy or demand one tribute too many, they end up extracting all the value from their environment it is possible to extract and then some.
The ‘and them some’ is what causes the trouble. Complex societies collapse because, when some stress comes, those societies have become too inflexible to respond. In retrospect, this can seem mystifying. Why didn’t these societies just re-tool in less complex ways? The answer Tainter gives is the simplest one: When societies fail to respond to reduced circumstances through orderly downsizing, it isn’t because they don’t want to, it’s because they can’t.
In such systems, there is no way to make things a little bit simpler – the whole edifice becomes a huge, interlocking system not readily amenable to change. Tainter doesn’t regard the sudden decoherence of these societies as either a tragedy or a mistake—”[U]nder a situation of declining marginal returns collapse may be the most appropriate response”, to use his pitiless phrase. Furthermore, even when moderate adjustments could be made, they tend to be resisted, because any simplification discomfits elites.
When the value of complexity turns negative, a society plagued by an inability to react remains as complex as ever, right up to the moment where it becomes suddenly and dramatically simpler, which is to say right up to the moment of collapse. Collapse is simply the last remaining method of simplification.


* * *

In the mid-90s, I got a call from some friends at ATT, asking me to help them research the nascent web-hosting business. They thought ATT’s famous “five 9′s” reliability (services that work 99.999% of the time) would be valuable, but they couldn’t figure out how $20 a month, then the going rate, could cover the costs for good web hosting, much less leave a profit.
I started describing the web hosting I’d used, including the process of developing web sites locally, uploading them to the server, and then checking to see if anything had broken.
“But if you don’t have a staging server, you’d be changing things on the live site!” They explained this to me in the tone you’d use to explain to a small child why you don’t want to drink bleach. “Oh yeah, it was horrible”, I said. “Sometimes the servers would crash, and we’d just have to re-boot and start from scratch.” There was a long silence on the other end, the silence peculiar to conference calls when an entire group stops to think.
The ATT guys had correctly understood that the income from $20-a-month customers wouldn’t pay for good web hosting. What they hadn’t understood, were in fact professionally incapable of understanding, was that the industry solution, circa 1996, was to offer hosting that wasn’t very good.
This, for the ATT guys, wasn’t depressing so much as confusing. We finished up the call, and it was polite enough, but it was perfectly clear that there wasn’t going to be a consulting gig out of it, because it wasn’t a market they could get into, not because they didn’t want to, but because they couldn’t.
It would be easy to regard this as short-sighted on their part, but that ignores the realities of culture. For a century, ATT’s culture had prized—insisted on—quality of service; they ran their own power grid to keep the dial-tone humming during blackouts. ATT, like most organizations, could not be good at the thing it was good at and good at the opposite thing at the same time. The web hosting business, because it followed the “Simplicity first, quality later” model, didn’t just present a new market, it required new cultural imperatives.


* * *

Dr. Amy Smith is a professor in the Department of Mechanical Engineering at MIT, where she runs the Development Lab, or D-Lab, a lab organized around simple and cheap engineering solutions for the developing world.
Among the rules of thumb she offers for building in that environment is this: “If you want something to be 10 times cheaper, take out 90% of the materials.” Making media is like that now except, for “materials”, substitute “labor.”


* * *

About 15 years ago, the supply part of media’s supply-and-demand curve went parabolic, with a predictably inverse effect on price. Since then, a battalion of media elites have lined up to declare that exactly the opposite thing will start happening any day now.
To pick a couple of examples more or less at random, last year Barry Diller of IAC said, of content available on the web, “It is not free, and is not going to be,” Steve Brill of Journalism Online said that users “just need to get back into the habit of doing so [paying for content] online”, and Rupert Murdoch of News Corp said “Web users will have to pay for what they watch and use.”
Diller, Brill, and Murdoch seem be stating a simple fact—we will have to pay them—but this fact is not in fact a fact. Instead, it is a choice, one its proponents often decline to spell out in full, because, spelled out in full, it would read something like this:
“Web users will have to pay for what they watch and use, or else we will have to stop making content in the costly and complex way we have grown accustomed to making it. And we don’t know how to do that.”


* * *

One of the interesting questions about Tainter’s thesis is whether markets and democracy, the core mechanisms of the modern world, will let us avoid complexity-driven collapse, by keeping any one group of elites from seizing unbroken control. This is, as Tainter notes in his book, an open question. There is, however, one element of complex society into which neither markets nor democracy reach—bureaucracy.
Bureaucracies temporarily suspend the Second Law of Thermodynamics. In a bureaucracy, it’s easier to make a process more complex than to make it simpler, and easier to create a new burden than kill an old one.
In spring of 2007, the web video comedy In the Motherhood made the move to TV. In the Motherhood started online as a series of short videos, with viewers contributing funny stories from their own lives and voting on their favorites. This tactic generated good ideas at low cost as well as endearing the show to its viewers; the show’s tag line was “By Moms, For Moms, About Moms.”
The move to TV was an affirmation of this technique; when ABC launched the public forum for the new TV version, they told users their input “might just become inspiration for a story by the writers.”
Or it might not. Once the show moved to television, the Writers Guild of America got involved. They were OK with For and About Moms, but By Moms violated Guild rules. The producers tried to negotiate, to no avail, so the idea of audience engagement was canned (as was In the Motherhood itself some months later, after failing to engage viewers as the web version had).
The critical fact about this negotiation wasn’t about the mothers, or their stories, or how those stories might be used. The critical fact was that the negotiation took place in the grid of the television industry, between entities incorporated around a 20th century business logic, and entirely within invented constraints. At no point did the negotiation about audience involvement hinge on the question “Would this be an interesting thing to try?”


* * *

Here is the answer to that question from the TV executives.
In the future, at least some methods of producing video for the web will become as complex, with as many details to attend to, as television has today, and people will doubtless make pots of money on those forms of production. It’s tempting, at least for the people benefitting from the old complexity, to imagine that if things used to be complex, and they’re going to be complex, then everything can just stay complex in the meantime. That’s not how it works, however.
The most watched minute of video made in the last five years shows baby Charlie biting his brother’s finger. (Twice!) That minute has been watched by more people than the viewership of American Idol, Dancing With The Stars, and the Superbowl combined. (174 million views and counting.)
Some video still has to be complex to be valuable, but the logic of the old media ecoystem, where video had to be complex simply to be video, is broken. Expensive bits of video made in complex ways now compete with cheap bits made in simple ways. “Charlie Bit My Finger” was made by amateurs, in one take, with a lousy camera. No professionals were involved in selecting or editing or distributing it. Not one dime changed hands anywhere between creator, host, and viewers. A world where that is the kind of thing that just happens from time to time is a world where complexity is neither an absolute requirement nor an automatic advantage.
When ecosystems change and inflexible institutions collapse, their members disperse, abandoning old beliefs, trying new things, making their living in different ways than they used to. It’s easy to see the ways in which collapse to simplicity wrecks the glories of old. But there is one compensating advantage for the people who escape the old system: when the ecosystem stops rewarding complexity, it is the people who figure out how to work simply in the present, rather than the people who mastered the complexities of the past, who get to say what happens in the future